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Organizations may view outsourcing as a way to manage risk. We developed a decision-analytic approach to
determine which risks the buyer can share or shift to vendors and which ones it should bear. We found that
allocating risks incorrectly could increase costs dramatically. Between 1995 and 1998, we used this approach to
develop the request for proposals (RFP) for the US Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) privatization initiative for
the Hanford tank waste remediation system (TWRS). In the model, we used an assessment protocol to predict
how vendors would react to proposed risk allocations in terms of their actions and their pricing. We considered
the impact of allocating each major risk to potential vendors, to the DOE, or to both and identiﬁed the risk
allocation that would minimize the DOE’s total cost—its direct payments to vendors plus the costs of any
residual risks it accepted. Allocating inappropriate risks to the vendor would have increased costs because the
vendor would add a large risk premium to its bids, while allocating inappropriate risks to the DOE also would
have increased costs because the vendor would not take adequate risk-reduction measures. With the improved
risk allocation, the RFPs resulted in bids that were acceptable to the DOE.
Key words: decision analysis: risks; government: agencies.
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I

n the mid 1990s, the US Department of Energy
(DOE) was planning the cleanup of its nuclear
waste tanks at the Hanford site in Washington State.
It faced well-documented problems, because of the
volume, the makeup, and the poor characterization
of the waste held in the underground storage tanks.
The DOE’s task was complicated by many legal
obligations and constraints, and by the political
sensitivity of the problem arising from a history of
delays, disagreements, and disclosures at the site. Various stakeholders were concerned about spending,
environmental issues, and radioactivity. The anticipated cost was in the tens of billions of dollars.
To minimize costs and risks, in 1994 the DOE
undertook what it called a privatization initiative
under which contractors (vendors) would have as
much decision-making authority and responsibility as
possible. The DOE, in partnership with the Paciﬁc

Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), established
a large privatization team near the Hanford site to
support this initiative. Its ﬁrst major task was to contract with one or more vendors for the development
and demonstration phase of the cleanup. The DOE
had to draft and issue a request for proposals (RFP),
evaluate and select bids, and negotiate contract terms.
Comments from potential vendors on a 1995 draft
RFP (TWRS Privatization 1995) showed that risk allocation was a major concern: the privatization initiative depended on the contractor’s being able to obtain
ﬁnancing, and the ﬁnancial market probably would
not accept certain risks. Other risks were potentially
acceptable but would require a high risk premium.
The potential vendors were under no obligation at
this point to tell the DOE how high the risk premium
really had to be, however, and the DOE wanted to
avoid being locked into bad contract terms.
180
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From late 1995 to early 1998, the PNNL contracted
with coauthors (Keisler, Buehring, and Whitﬁeld) all
at that time from Argonne National Laboratory’s
(ANL) Decision and Information Sciences Division
to support the risk-management group (headed by
coauthors McLaughlin and Robershotte) of its privatization team. Thus, the PNNL was the direct client
for this work, using it to write portions of the RFP
that the DOE ultimately issued (TWRS Privatization
1996). ANL proposed the basic structure for this work
and conducted most of the assessments and analysis, while the PNNL advised on the approach, participated in the assessments, managed interactions with
the privatization team, and integrated the results with
the rest of the privatization plan. We developed a
decision-analytic approach to help the DOE determine how it should allocate risks within the RFP, that
is, to what extent should the DOE accept risks and to
what extent should it pass risks on to the vendor?
We deﬁned alternative allocations and assessed the
risks resulting from them to quantify their cost implications, while accounting for the different incentives
and risk-bearing capacity of the DOE and its potential vendors, leading to a successful RFP and further
efforts to institutionalize our approach.
The problem of how to allocate risks is prevalent in
all sorts of contracting situations, and using RFPs that
allocate risks poorly can cause inefﬁcient outcomes.
Our conceptual approach applies in many of those
situations.

Conceptual Approach
Allocating a risk to the party better able to control
it motivates that party to ﬁnd the best way to manage that risk. Each party has expectations about how
the other will behave given the incentives implied by
the risk allocation, and those expectations ought to
inform contractual negotiations. It is also reasonable
to think that the larger party (the government in this
case) would be better able to deal with large variances
in ﬁnancial outcomes than would smaller parties
(vendors). This implies that, other things remaining
equal, the contractors would demand a larger premium to bear risks than would the government. To
allocate risks efﬁciently, the decision makers must
take note of all these factors and balance them.
Viewing this as a decision-analysis problem, with
the DOE as the decision maker, we wanted to choose
the risk allocation that would maximize the DOE’s
expected utility. It faced environmental uncertainties and uncertainties about how vendors would
respond to the proposal. Inspired by game theory,
or at least the asymmetric prescriptive-descriptive
approach Raiffa (1982) outlined, we built a prescriptive model for the DOE’s decisions and a descriptive model for the vendor’s decisions. From the DOE’s

RFP

Price

Mitigation Exogenous Amelioration
(DOE) (Vendor)
(DOE) (Vendor)

DOE
view

Vendor
view

Figure 1: Stylized decision trees were used to represent the cash ﬂows
resulting from a contract. For the DOE, the ﬁrst node is the DOE’s decision
about how to allocate risks in the RFP. The second node is the potential
vendor’s decision (an uncertainty from the DOE’s perspective) about what
price to bid (to be predicted using a vendor-response model). The third
node represents the DOE’s decisions taken to mitigate risks. The fourth
node consists of the vendor’s decisions taken to mitigate risks (independent of the previous node). Following this are uncertain exogenous
events, after which the DOE acts to ameliorate the outcomes for the events
that have occurred, after which the vendor does the same (independent
of the previous node). The DOE’s end-point values are determined by the
contractual payments it makes to the vendor along with the costs incurred
due to the risks it bears and the events that occur. For the vendor, the ﬁrst
node is an uncertainty about how the DOE decided to issue the RFP. The
second node is the vendor’s decision about what price to bid. The third
node is a decision node about its steps to mitigate risks. The fourth node
is an uncertainty about the DOE’s steps to mitigate risks (independent of
the vendor’s choices about the same), and the ﬁfth node consists of uncertain exogenous events. The ﬁfth node consists of the vendor’s decisions
to ameliorate negative outcomes, and the sixth node is the DOE’s actions
(about which the vendor is uncertain) to ameliorate risks (again independent of the previous node).

point of view, the problem could be viewed as a stylized decision tree with nodes representing its decisions and nodes representing uncertainties (Figure 1).
From the vendor’s point of view, the DOE has
already chosen its risk allocation. We simpliﬁed the
vendor’s decision tree and assumed that the vendor’s
goal is to maximize its chance of getting the contract,
that is, to bid as low a price as possible, subject to
the constraint that it still be possible to ﬁnance the
project. That is, it passes on the risks it faces to its
ﬁnanciers and it is these ﬁnanciers’ risk attitudes that
we modeled.
The ﬁnanciers consist of equity and debt providers.
Equity providers consider the predicted variance
of cash ﬂows and demand an expected return on
equity based on that risk. Debt providers look at the
likelihood that they will be repaid without problems
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and demand not only that an interest rate be based on
that measure of risk but also that the project have a
percentage of equity investment that depends on the
level of risk. The prediction of cash ﬂows (that will
be used to make debt payments and the amount of
residual cash ﬂow left to give a return on equity) is
based on the vendor’s anticipated ﬁxed and variable
costs, the contracted price for waste treated, and the
possible consequences of risks as allocated in the RFP.

Assessment of Individual Risks
We started with a list of 100 risks. We combined
some of the risks and narrowed the list substantially.
The ﬁnal list contained risks for which the potential
impact was sizable, the range of possible allocations
was substantial, and the right allocation was not obvious. We examined nine major risks, some requiring
separate assessment of subsidiary risks:
(1) Interest rate (interest rates may change between
the time of the bid and ﬁnancing),
(2) Inﬂation (the vendor faces exposure to inﬂation
risk in the draft RFP),
(3) Change in law (applicable laws and regulations
may change),
(4) Permitting (the vendor may not be able to
obtain necessary permits),
(5) Waste envelope C (probably the most technically difﬁcult waste to process),
(6) Appropriation (Congress may not appropriate
funds adequate for planned activities),
(7) Decontamination and decommissioning (D and
D may be more costly than expected),
(8) Other uncontrollable circumstances (lawsuit,
sabotage, earthquake, tornado), and
(9) Not-to-exceed (NTE) price risk (the contract
pricing arrangement could be a literal price limit, as
in the draft RFP, or could be a target price that allows
selected adjustments).
We also assessed a background risk level for the
DOE and the vendor, that is, the residual risk each
would bear even if all nine risks resolved to their base
cases.
We characterized each risk through discussions
with the PNNL privatization staff experts. We used a
common form to organize the assessments. For each
risk, we deﬁned three alternative allocations: the risk
was to be borne primarily by the DOE, to be shared,
or to be borne primarily by the vendor. We constructed these allocations using both qualitative and
quantitative deﬁnitions to match reasonable alternative phrasings the DOE might include in the RFP. This
meant, for example, that even for risks allocated primarily to the vendor, the DOE could still bear some
tangible risk. Similarly, shared risk does not necessitate a completely symmetric risk-bearing arrangement. The speciﬁc vendor was not yet known, so
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we did our assessments for a representative potential vendor. We intended the deﬁnitions to be precise enough to translate without ambiguity to speciﬁc
wording within the RFP. When the DOE later used
the model to evaluate speciﬁc bids, we conducted different assessments for different vendors.
We then deﬁned the possible outcomes. After
obtaining verbal descriptions of the mitigation steps
each party would likely take under each potential risk
allocation, we assessed probabilities of each outcome
(implicitly conditioned on the likely mitigating steps
taken by both parties). For this step, we tried to take
the vendor’s view as well as the DOE’s view. We
assumed that vendors would assign the same probabilities to each outcome as would the DOE, unless
there were special reasons not to (for example, the
DOE might be far more trustworthy regarding a certain risk than the vendor believed, or the vendor
might be more concerned about different risks and
events than would the DOE). We also obtained verbal
descriptions of the steps each party would be likely
to take to ameliorate the negative outcomes of risks
under each allocation.
Finally, we obtained verbal descriptions of what the
consequences would be for each side for each outcome of the risk, assuming both sides had taken the
predicted steps. From this information, we assessed
point estimates or probability distributions over the
ﬁnancial consequences for each side. The consequences were deﬁned in terms of the net present
value (NPV) of cash ﬂows computed at the current
risk-free rate, and expressed as increments from a
base case in which the project proceeds without difﬁculty. In some cases, we noted that outcomes of one
risk would determine the relevance of other risks; for
example, if the project stopped early, later risks would
not affect cash ﬂows.
The following summary of one such assessment,
namely the assessment for D and D risk, illustrates the
process of deﬁning the alternate allocations and the
risk-management scenarios and the resulting parameters that we used in the model (Table 1). It took us
approximately one half day to assess this risk. Keisler
and Buehring (1996) give the details of all the risk
assessments.
Results of Interviews to Characterize One of the
Risks (D and D)
Risk Name: Decontamination and decommissioning (D and D).
Description: D and D may be more costly than
expected, particularly if the vendor is not provided
with an incentive, through allocation of risk to the
vendor, to keep these costs low.
Consequences: The consequence is given in terms
of the probability distribution over D and D costs,
assumed to occur 10 years after production starts.
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Risk allocation

DOE takes risk

Shared risk

Vendor takes risk

Description

DOE is responsible
for D and D.

Vendor sets aside limited funds,
which may be refunded if D and D
costs are less than expected.

Vendor is responsible for D and D; DOE pays
excess if vendor reaches the
hypothetical limit of its ability to pay.

Probability
distribution for
cost to DOE

$5 M : 10%
−$50 M : 40%
−$150 M : 50%

Probability
distribution for
cost to vendor

No cost

$2 M:30%
−$40 M : 60%
−$140 M : 10%

0  75%
−$50 M : 25%

$3 M : 30%
−$10 M : 70%

$5 M : 50%
−$50 M : 25%
−$100 M : 25%

Table 1: We summarized the risk-assessment interviews in the form of quantitative descriptions of the risks used
as inputs to the simulation model. The description for the D and D risk shown here is typical.

Low cost is approximately $5 million less net D and
D cost than expected. Medium cost is approximately
$50 million more net D and D cost than expected.
High cost is approximately $150 million more net D
and D cost than expected.

DOE and the vendor can inﬂuence outcomes and
have the incentive to do so under a shared-risk
scenario.

Risk Allocation (Representative Characteristics)
The DOE bears the risk: The DOE states up front that
it is responsible, and the vendor allocates no money
for D and D.
Shared risk: Responsibility is deﬁned, and the vendor establishes a medium-sized sinking fund and gets
money back if D and D is under budget; the DOE
covers overage.
The vendor bears the risk: The vendor pays for D
and D and must establish a large sinking fund from
the start; it gets the unused money back.

We deﬁned four main risk-allocation strategies for
further analysis (Table 2). Each strategy consisted of
speciﬁc allocations for each of the nine risks. All of
these strategies were within the realm of possibility.
Prior to engaging us to work on the problem, the DOE
was heading toward something close to the vendorbears strategy (Strategy 3). This strategy is quite similar to the 1995 draft RFP, and even after we started
work, a senior DOE ofﬁcial declared that the DOE
would “shift all risks to the vendor.” Potential vendors in turn had indicated that just about every risk
should be borne by the DOE (Strategy 1), although,
predictably, the DOE was skeptical of such a position.
As we analyzed individual risks, the analysis (and
other factors) inﬂuenced the RFP. By the time we ﬁnished analyzing the various strategies, Strategy 2 had

Mitigation and Prevention Strategies
The DOE bears the risk: The DOE establishes strict
standards the vendor must follow in planning and
operation and have close cooperation with environmental regulators.
Shared risk: The DOE monitors the vendor somewhat in planning; the vendor is responsible for operation with checkpoints. The DOE, the vendor, and
the regulators together coordinate some of these
activities.
The vendor bears the risk: The DOE intervenes
only in extreme cases; all the vendor’s actions take
into account their impact on future D and D costs,
and the vendor works hard to establish rapport with
regulators.
Likelihood of Occurrence
The DOE bears the risk: Low cost = 10 percent,
medium cost = 40 percent, high cost = 50 percent.
Shared risk: Low cost = 30 percent, medium cost =
60 percent, high cost = 10 percent.
The vendor bears the risk: Low cost = 25 percent,
medium cost = 50 percent, high cost = 25 percent.
Costs are lowest when the risk is shared and highest when the DOE bears the risk, because both the

Modeling

Strategy
Name
Risk name
Interest rate
Inﬂation
Changes in law
Permitting
Waste stream C
Appropriation
D and D/RCRA
Lawsuit
Sabotage
Earthquake
Tornado
Not to exceed

1

2

3

DOE

Shared

Vendor

DOE
DOE
DOE
DOE
DOE
DOE
DOE
DOE
DOE
DOE
DOE
DOE

Vendor
DOE
DOE
Shared
Vendor
Vendor
Shared
Shared
DOE
DOE
DOE
Shared

Vendor
Vendor
Vendor
Vendor
Vendor
Vendor
Vendor
Vendor
Vendor
Vendor
Vendor
Vendor

Table 2: For each risk-allocation strategy, we deﬁned how each risk would
be allocated. Sharing risks did not mean that each risk is shared: some
risks are shared, but other risks could still be allocated entirely to one
party or the other.
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Vendor mean cost increment
Vendor standard deviation
DOE mean cost increment
DOE standard deviation
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1 ($)

2 ($)

3 ($)

157
55876
336731
133409

32660
61780
107625
82517

106152
94655
60400
70675

Table 3: We generated key summary statistics from the risk simulations
(ﬁgures in thousands). These results described the impact of risk sharing,
but we still needed to incorporate the main cost, direct payments from the
DOE to the vendor.

support at some levels but this support was neither
complete nor ﬁnal. At management’s request we also
included Strategy 4 (not shown), which differed only
slightly from Strategy 2 and under which the DOE
fared slightly worse.
We used a Monte Carlo simulation with 1,000 iterations to produce proﬁles for each risk. For each
iteration, we summed the increments from the base
case due to each risk. The result, after accounting for
risk interactions, was a frequency distribution over
the total increments (in which higher costs in the
chart correspond to reduced proﬁts) to the base case,
including payments for both the vendor and the DOE,
for each of the strategies considered (Table 3).
As a measure of the reliability of the simulation
results under repeated simulations, we used the standard deviation of the average cost for a given strategy,
which was approximately $2 million.
Vendor Response
We then had to predict the price the vendor would
charge under each strategy, which we could combine
with the DOE’s risk proﬁle to obtain a net-cost distribution for the DOE.
Based on extensive conversations with the privatization ﬁnancial task leader for the TWRS and with
external ﬁnancial consultants, we developed equations to predict how the vendor would set a price in
response to any given set of risks and risk-allocation
decisions. We validated these equations using experts’
predictions regarding speciﬁc changes to the risk proﬁle for which subjective estimates were fairly easy
to provide. We then had other experts conﬁrm that
the parameter values we used were realistic. Our
purpose was to codify judgments rather than to
describe exactly and in detail what any particular ﬁrm
would do.
One important variable used in the ﬁnancial-risk
model was the probability of default, for which we
used as a proxy the probability that the vendor would
face an after-tax loss larger than its equity stake.
Speciﬁcally, we calculated the probability that h − i <
−j + k, where
h is the baseline NPV of vendor cash ﬂows discounted at the risk-free rate,

i is the net impact on vendor cash ﬂows from
all risks, also in terms of dollars discounted at the
risk-free rate (we approximated the probability distribution on i by ﬁtting a normal distribution to the
simulation results),
j is the amount of equity the vendor puts up, and
k is the relative tax beneﬁt of reduced proﬁts in
unfavorable cases compared to the baseline.
We determined cash ﬂows by entering the proposed ﬁnancing terms and price into a ﬁnancial
model (Weimar and Paananen 1995) based on standard accounting practice and developed by the privatization ﬁnance task manager to predict the DOE’s
and the vendor’s costs in a deterministic base case
and to clarify the literal implications of contract terms
(Figure 2).
We assumed that the vendor would raise prices
in response to being forced to take on additional
risk in the following ways: (1) Risks that are predominantly downside would decrease the expected
return; the vendor would raise the price to bring the
expected return back to its baseline value. (2) Risks
that increase the probability of default make it harder
to obtain debt ﬁnancing, so we assume the interest
rate for debt ﬁnancing corresponds to the degree of
risk and the percentage of equity required, both of
which we assume would increase when downside
risk increases. (3) Equity providers are concerned with
predictability on both the upside and the downside,
so they would raise the required return on equity
when the overall risk level increases.
The risk proﬁles and the vendor-response models determine the vendor’s required internal rate of
return (IRR); we must link this IRR to the main ﬁnancial model to determine a target price for the vendor
and the corresponding distribution over cash ﬂows.
These cash ﬂows in turn determine debt terms (fraction of debt and debt interest rate) and costs, from
which we calculate the probability of default. The
equations below implicitly deﬁne an upward sloping curve with capital costs on the y-axis and probability of default on the x-axis. For given ﬁnancing
terms, there is also an implicit curve for price versus
probability of default, which is downward sloping
because raising the price gives the vendor a cushion
that lowers the probability of default. We then use a
modiﬁed binary search algorithm to identify the minimum price at which the vendor could still ﬁnance
the project, subject to the following constraints: that
the IRR is no less than that given by Equation (1),
that the debt fraction is no greater than that given by
Equations (2) and (3), and that the debt interest rate is
no less than that given by Equation (4). The solution
lies where the curve representing price versus probability of default intersects the curve representing the
ﬁnancier’s capital cost versus probability of default.
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Strategy

Simulation
output

Summary
statistics

Financing
terms

DOE
incremental
costs

Vendor
incremental
costs

Objectives

DOE
cost
Vendor
price

DOE RFP
risk
allocation

Pro forma
financials

Mean
increment

Required
IRR

Variance of
increment

Debt rate

DOE
baseline
cash flows

Vendor
baseline
cash flows

Vendor
profit

Probability of
default

Debt
fraction

Figure 2: This stylized inﬂuence diagram represents the ﬁnancial relationships in the model. The model predicts price from risk allocation and other assumptions. The inﬂuence diagram has two features that make it
unconventional—the circular relationship involving price and probability of default and the fact that mean, variance, and probability of default are summary statistics derived from the probability distribution over the vendor
cost increment (derived from end points of the decision tree in Figure 1).

In other words, the solution lies where the project’s
pro forma NPV including debt costs is exactly 0 when
discounted at the predicted IRR requirement.
Equations Used to Represent Vendor Financial
Response to Programmatic Risks
After obtaining advice concerning a few key considerations, we postulated the following relationships.
The ﬁnancial experts based their estimates of parameter values on their knowledge of other debt offerings,
including situations in which debt ratings (which
have a known relation to default rates) and corresponding terms were available.
The required after-tax internal rate of return (IRR)
is given by
IRR = k1 + k2 × A + k3 × B

where

(1)

k1 = 0 03 (the risk-free rate),
k2 = 0 0275 (the increase in IRR required to accommodate $10 million of average downside), and
k3 = 0 025 (the sensitivity of interest rate to variance
in NPV of cash ﬂows).
In this equation and in the ones that follow,
A denotes the variance in the vendor cost distribution (expressed in dollars2 × 109 ), and
B denotes the vendor mean cost increment (in
dollars ×105 ) from the simulation results.

If the probability of default (P ) is less than ﬁve percent, the maximum debt fraction (DF) is given by
DF = k4 − k5 × P − 0 03 × A/k6 k10

where

(2)

k4 = 0 95 (the maximum debt fraction for a
hypothetical case with zero percent probability of
default),
k5 = 1 5 (the sensitivity of the debt fraction to the
probability of default),
k6 = 3 23 (the variance corresponding to the minimum vendor risk case, including the assumed level
of background risk), and
k10 = 3 0 (the exponential sensitivity of the debt
fraction to variance). We used the last part of the
equation in particular to calibrate predicted ﬁnancing terms for experts’ judgments. We were aware
that it lacked a further theoretical basis, but given
our time constraints, we used it, albeit cautiously. In
later applications, we implemented this element of the
model more elegantly.
If the probability of default is greater than or equal
to ﬁve percent, the debt fraction is given by
DF = k4 − k5 × P − 0 03 × A/k6 k10
− k7 × P − T 

where

(3)
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k7 = 16 (marginal sensitivity of debt fraction to
default rate for risky projects), and
T = 0 05 (the probability of default corresponding
to ﬁnanciers’ threshold of great concern). This threshold is analogous to a downgrading of the debt on the
project, which we assessed subjectively as the point
at which the project would change from business as
usual into what ﬁnanciers would view as risky.
The minimum required debt interest rate (DR) is
given by
DR = M + k8 × P /Y + k9 × A/k6

where

with the intuitions and expectations of the ﬁnancial
experts and of the privatization team management.
We concluded that the ﬁnancing terms and the corresponding price for the baseline case were reasonable. The model’s predicted impact of risk allocations
on ﬁnancing terms is of the same order as the ﬁnancial advisors’ estimates of those impacts for several
particular reference risks that were fairly easy to
judge. Our experts thought these parameters would
provide reasonable results over the range of strategies
we examined and, in particular, for considering the
incremental impact of changes to the risk-allocation
strategy.

(4)

M = 0 0737 (the T -bond yield at the time of the
study),
Y = 0 07, considered to be near the maximum
allowable probability of default,
P = the probability of default (computed by the
model),
k8 = 0 138 (the coefﬁcient of the sensitivity of the
debt interest rate to the probability of default), and
k9 = 0 015 (the sensitivity of the debt interest rate to
the variance in cash ﬂows).
Where possible, the ﬁnancial advisors identiﬁed
analogous ﬁnancing packages in the market; for
example, bonds with a given rating have a historical annual default rate and a known risk premium
over T -bonds. By ﬁnding a bond rating corresponding to Y = 0 07 and assuming a linear relationship
between yield and default rate, one can estimate k8 .
We derived some parameters directly from such market data, estimated some using subjective judgment
informed by such data, and estimated others, such
as k10 , by obtaining expert judgments about what
ﬁnancing terms ought to be for a small number of
speciﬁed artiﬁcial scenarios and ﬁtting the values
to mimic those expert judgments. We compared the
implications of the model, for a wide range of cases,
Strategy

Numerical Results
By optimizing our model, we obtained vendor ﬁnancial terms (Table 4). By adding the DOE’s payment to
the vendor to the DOE’s simulation summary statistics, we obtained the ﬁnancial measures of direct
interest to the DOE (Table 4).
The distributions over vendor cost (Figure 3) and
the DOE’s net costs for the entire contract period
(Figure 4) for each strategy show some expected
characteristics, such as the low risk to the vendor
and the wider spread for the DOE when the DOE
bears the risks. The vendor’s risk distribution showed
much greater potential for loss than for gain, which
explained why, in the initial discussions of the draft
RFP, vendors indicated they would require higher
payments than the DOE had expected. Most risks
were to be assigned to one party or the other; however, the middle case (RFP) actually reduced the
DOE’s total downside risk. Some of the distributions
had spikes near $0, corresponding to cases in which
the vendor would be made whole (that is, the DOE
would reimburse the vendor for all expenses including ﬁnancing costs) after the project ended.
1

2

3

3.4%
11.6%
86.6%
9.3%

5.17%
14.3%
82.7%
9.8%

8.23%
30.3%
30.6%
11.6%

Price paid to the vendor by DOE
DOE payment to vendor ($K)

$602255

$636530

$1397921

DOE ﬁnancial measures
DOE mean cost increment
DOE standard deviation
DOE total cost

$336731
$133409
$938986

$107625
$82517
$744155

$60400
$70675
$1458321

Vendor ﬁnancial measures
Probability of default (P)
Required internal rate of return (IRR)
Debt fraction (%) (DF)
Debt interest rate (DR)

Table 4: Key ﬁnancial measures of interest to the vendor were tracked for each strategy. When the vendor bears
all risks (Strategy 3), the difﬁculty of ﬁnancing the project results in the DOE having to make much higher payments to the vendor. Although the DOE could minimize its direct payments to the vendor by accepting all risks,
this would usually lead to higher total costs.
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DOE Bears Risk

Frequency
in simulation
results
-$200M

$0

$200M Vendor Cost Increment

Shared Risk

Frequency
in simulation
results
-$200M

$0

$200M

Vendor Bears Risk

Frequency
in simulation
results
-$200M

Vendor Cost Increment

$0

$200M Vendor Cost Increment

Figure 3: The vendor’s distribution of cost increments (the deviation from
contracted payments in the base case) depends on the risk allocation.
Under the shared-risk strategy, the vendor has somewhat greater spread
over its potential costs, but its mean costs do not increase much.

In analyzing the strategies and the results for
each, we demonstrated that, indeed, sharing the risks
would lead to savings. Allocating all the risks to the
DOE would mean the vendor would not do enough
to keep costs low, while allocating all the risks to the
vendor would cause the vendor to demand too high
a risk premium; thus, the DOE would obtain the low-

Frequency
in simulation
results
$0.5B

DOE Bears Risk

$1B

Frequency
in simulation
results
$0.5B

Frequency
in simulation
results

$0.5B

$1.5B DOE Net Cost

Shared Risk
$1B

$1.5B

DOE Net Cost

Vendor Bears Risk
$1B

$1.5B

DOE Net Cost

Figure 4: The histograms we generated for each risk-allocation strategy
show that sharing risk stochastically dominates the two extreme risk allocations and so reduces both the DOE’s expected cost and its risk.
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est costs with Strategy 2. By bearing all risk, the DOE
would obtain the lowest price, because the vendor
would have a lower mean cost increment and variance and thus the best ﬁnancing terms. By sharing
risks, the DOE would make payments to the vendor
that would be six percent ($34 million) higher than
those under Strategy 1, but the savings to the DOE
from impacts of residual risks would lead to a net cost
savings for the DOE of over 20 percent ($194 million).
Compared to the strategy in which the vendor bears
all risks (Strategy 3), Strategy 2 requires the DOE to
pay costs due to residual risks that are 78 percent
higher ($47 million) but the total cost savings to the
DOE are nearly 50 percent ($714 million) because it
would pay a smaller risk premium to the vendor. The
price for Strategy 3 would make the project infeasible.
In spite of the cost difference, the standard deviation
of the DOE costs under Strategy 2 was only slightly
higher than under Strategy 3. Strategy 3, the costliest approach, was the DOE’s preferred strategy going
into this effort, but the ﬁgure given, $714 million, perhaps overstates the potential savings accruing under
Strategy 2: if bids came in that high, the DOE could
have issued, with difﬁculty, a revised RFP.
Our presentation of these results triggered an animated discussion. At that time, the DOE managers
essentially switched their support from an RFP that
allocated most of the risks to the vendor to one that
shared risks. We then reﬁned the proposed RFP by
performing a one-way sensitivity analysis for allocation of each risk, using Strategy 2 as a basis. We
identiﬁed the allocation for each risk that minimized
the DOE’s cost when other risks were left unchanged.
From these allocations we constructed Strategy 5,
which resembled Strategy 2, except that the DOE and
the vendor shared the interest rate, changes-in-law,
waste-stream-C, and appropriation risks. In particular, by completely allocating to the vendors risks
that they believed were under the DOE’s control, for
example, appropriation, D and D, and permitting, the
DOE would increase its cost: vendors would assume
the worst and incorporate such risks into their price.
For comparison, we added Strategy 6, in which
all risks are shared, as well as many other variations (not shown) that we considered at the DOE’s
request. When the DOE and the vendor share all
risks, the mean cost increment to the DOE is higher
than in Strategy 2, as is the payment to the vendor,
and so Strategy 6 is $24 million worse than Strategy 2. Strategy 5 had a mean cost increment to the
DOE of $5 million more than Strategy 2, in exchange
for a $15 million reduction in payments to the vendor, for an additional savings of $10 million along
with a slight reduction in the standard deviation of
$2 million.
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By changing the allocation of the other risks, the
DOE would obtain relatively minor potential cost
increases or cost savings. This implied that if the vendors seemed very concerned about risks for which
the model predicted little increase in costs (for example, if the vendor demanded an additional $50 million
to accept waste-stream-C risk), then the DOE could
make concessions on those risks (for example, accept
the risk rather than pay the premium). Such risks
might have symbolic value for the vendor or the vendor might have a more pessimistic view of the situation than it merited. Conversely, if the vendors were
more willing to accept a risk than the model predicted, the DOE could try to obtain concessions from
the vendor to reduce its total cost. The entire portfolio of risks matters and must be considered as a unit.
For example, although the impact of shifting the NTE
risk entirely to the vendor from Strategy 2 (in which it
is shared) is $41 million, the cost of shifting the NTE
risk to the vendor when the vendor already bears all
other risks would be much larger ($198 million). In
other words, the vendors can bear a little risk comfortably, but beyond a certain threshold, vendors will not
assume additional risk without penalizing the DOE
dramatically.
The ﬁnal RFP was very close to our recommendation of Strategy 5. It had some reﬁnements based in
part on further application of our model. The DOE
received several bids and selected two vendors for
the technology-development stage. Although the cost
included ﬁnancing charges that the DOE perceived as
high, the bids came in lower than the DOE’s previous cost estimates and lower than bids that it had
expected prior to the reallocation of risk in the RFP.

Decision-Support System
When the DOE issued the RFP, we anticipated it
would need to evaluate bidders’ suggestions and
requests quickly during the bid-selection and negotiation phases. We improved some parts of the model
to speed the DOE’s response and to take advantage
of insights gained along the way. We then created
a decision-support system (DSS) rather than a oneoff model. The resulting system answered negotiators’ what-if questions in about half an hour, instead
of the half a day or more the original model could
take, depending on the complexity of the question. To
make some of the improvements, we relied on standard methods to make models faster, more ﬂexible,
and more user-friendly. In particular, we restructured
the model to use modular components and automated
most tasks. We also made conceptual improvements
that made the model more efﬁcient than it was in
our earlier efforts; we recommend such improvements
as a starting point for similar efforts others might
undertake.
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We used neater risk templates to make it easier to
structure and assess large models. We developed four
basic templates to characterize risks that would be
common to many procurement contracts, speciﬁcally
permitting, processing, early termination, and ongoing ﬁnancial risks. For each stage of the contracted
project, users must complete one type of risk template, possibly for several risks of that type. The DOE
would have to successfully resolve risks from each
stage to move on to the next stage. This fact led to
the next feature. We modeled risk interactions using
a precedence matrix, in which a cell entry of 1 or 0
indicates whether the DOE must successfully resolve
the risk in the corresponding column before going on
to encounter the risk in the corresponding row. This
matrix made it easy to add individual risks without
affecting the rest of the simulation and allowed us to
represent interactions in a more compact and comprehensive way.
We reﬁned the vendor-response function and made
it more transparent based on further meetings with
the project’s external advisors. The simulation (and
templates) in the DSS speciﬁcally noted potential
default events and, separately, more severe writeoff events in which lenders would lose principal. In
the original model, ﬁnancier concerns about writeoff events were reﬂected in the exponential penalty
function we used for situations in which the probability of default was above ﬁve percent. Considering write-off risks explicitly is more precise, and by
doing so we replaced the exponential penalty for high
default probability with linear functions of the default
and write-off probabilities. The DSS records future
write-off events and default events as parts of the
outcomes of individual risks as it simulates them.
It does not directly calculate the debt fraction but
instead derives it from a debt-service-coverage-ratio
requirement found in practice. This structure facilitated assessments (with which everyone was more
comfortable) of the judgmental model relating project
summary statistics to ﬁnancing terms. We ended by
streamlining and automating the optimization subroutine for ﬁnding the vendor’s minimum price.

Organizational Impact
The insights from our analysis produced consensus
within the privatization team and within the DOE.
The DOE managers presented the conceptual summary diagram (Department of Energy Privatization
Working Group 1998, §5, Figure 4.6) on risk sharing to the then secretary of energy, Hazel O’Leary.
One purpose of our effort was to provide the DOE
with evidence about the potential consequences of
insisting that the vendors alone should bear the risk,
and we successfully showed that doing this would
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have a high cost. The DOE included our results in its
report to the US Congress on the privatization project
(Department of Energy Privatization Working Group
1998, §3.4), which described the model’s impact:
The DOE also concluded that the level of uncertainty
with respect to design, ﬁnancing, and regulation at
the end of Part A was such that ﬁxing prices would
require an excessive price to compensate for the risk
faced by the vendor. Thus, a design phase (referred
to as Part B-1 in the contract) was deﬁned to reduce
this uncertainty and to provide the DOE with various reviews and decision points prior to proceeding
with construction and operations. The design phase
will allow time to verify technology performance on
Hanford-speciﬁc wastes and to optimize debt and
equity arrangements and technical requirements.

The ﬂexibility that the design phase added proved
important. Our new approach to risk allocation kept
privatization viable up to that point. Our work convinced the DOE to take a more businesslike attitude
toward risk. The DOE’s report to Congress (Department of Energy Privatization Working Group 1998,
§3.2) included the following lessons learned:
Need for an equitable risk allocation. In the early stages of
developing the Phase I contracting approach, the DOE
recognized that privatization is effective in shifting signiﬁcant performance risk to the vendor, but some risks
would have to remain with the DOE. For example,
the DOE recognized that the private sector would not
accept the risk of potential ﬂuctuations in yearly budget appropriations. In addition, the DOE recognized
the need to absorb the risks associated with its own
performance in areas such as waste characterization
and preexisting conditions.

The DOE privatization working group (Department
of Energy Privatization Working Group 1998, Case
study 6) prepared a report on privatization for the
secretary of energy. Its list of lessons learned from this
project included the following:
Risk Allocation. This is the single most important feature of the “deal” to be established. There must be an
equitable allocation of risk between the DOE and the
vendor. The vendor must be held responsible for the
risks that it can control—for example, technical and
performance risks. The DOE needs to be responsible
for risks that it can control—for example, governmentfurnished items and minimum waste quantities.

The overall report, which helped lead to establishment of the DOE’s Ofﬁce of Privatization and
Contract Reform, contained the following recommendation (Department of Energy Privatization Working
Group 1998, §2, recommendation 5):
The DOE should better integrate the perspectives of the
business community into its privatization initiatives. One
of the keys to successful privatization at the Department is the ability to structure business deals that will

attract the business community by, for example, ensuring a proper balance between risk and reward.

This represented a complete turnaround from the
view that the vendors should carry all risks, which
had led to discouraging comments in response to the
draft RFP.
Afterword
Through 1998, the DOE used the model often on an
ad hoc basis in ﬁnalizating the RFP and selecting
vendors and negotiations with the remaining vendor
(of two initially selected) going into what was called
Phase 1B-1 (the ﬁrst stage was Phase 1A). In this case,
the DOE used the model to evaluate whether the vendor’s proposed risk allocation was reasonable and to
negotiate an agreement (McLaughlin et al. 1998). Over
the rest of the demonstration phase up to the start
of full-scale production, the DSS forecast the optimal strategy to have expected costs of $3 billion to
$5 billion less than strategies allocating almost all risk
to either the DOE or the vendor.
The larger privatization effort had a disappointing
end, however, for reasons that were beyond the scope
of the RFP risk-allocation decisions. About a year after
the last agreement, after developing much of the technology, the vendor suddenly raised its price estimates
for the next stage by more than 100 percent. The
reasons behind this move were controversial (Welch
2000). The risk of increased costs had been allocated
so that when costs became higher than the DOE considered acceptable, the vendor gave up the technology it had developed and lost out on all incentive
payments, while the DOE paid for the work completed and incurred holding costs while seeking a
replacement. The DOE used its option to abandon
its contract with the vendor (and with it, the privatization initiative) at the end of the design phase
and then adopted a more conventional governmentowned, contractor-operated approach.

Summary
Our new approach led to the DOE’s successful
issuance of an RFP that at one time had large expected
savings in the hundreds of millions of dollars or more.
In this case, we cannot trace good decisions about
risk allocation to good ultimate outcomes, but this
approach allowed the privatization program the good
intermediate outcome of continuing; it attracted two
vendors for Phase IA, when zero response would
have been likely given the DOE’s original attitudes
toward assigning risk. In retrospect, the DOE may
have made too much of a stretch in attempting to
switch to a privatization regime under which it would
have to behave as just another business.
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That should not deter others—certainly businesses
involved in procurement and probably governmental agencies as well—from considering this approach.
Government agencies should consider the Hanford
cleanup a rather extreme case. In many simpler situations, this approach could help a bureaucracy to
overcome its reluctance to share risks. The DOE’s documented lessons learned apply in such cases. Companies doing business with government agencies may
also ﬁnd our approach useful as a way to help the
agency understand the company’s positions in negotiations that include the allocation of risks.
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99352, writes: “I was The Deputy Manager of the
Waste Disposal Integration Team (WIT) at the Hanford, Washington Department of Energy (DOE) site
from 1995–1998. The WIT was the Paciﬁc Northwest National Laboratory team (also referred to as
the Privatization Team) responsible for assisting the
DOE with developing, implementing, and managing
the contracting strategy for the cleanup of massive
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allocation modeling to support this multi-billion dollar DOE Tank Waste Retrieval System (TWRS) Privatization effort.
“I verify that the authors of paper 54-702-JK (Keisler,
Buehring, McLaughlin, Robershotte, and Whitﬁeld)
did in fact do the work described for the TWRS Privatization team in the roles they detailed, and that their
efforts did have the impact they describe. The concept
of proper and appropriate risk allocation was key in
garnering private industry support for this huge and
complex cleanup effort. Speciﬁcally, the Request for
Proposal (RFP) was modiﬁed based in part on their
recommendations. The DOE received bids in response
to the modiﬁed RFP, which enabled the initiative to
proceed at that time.”

